Abstract. The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transformation (Fiat and Shamir, Crypto '86) is a popular paradigm for constructing very efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments and signature schemes using a hash function, starting from any three-move interactive protocol satisfying certain properties. Despite its wide-spread applicability both in theory and in practice, the known positive results for proving security of the FS paradigm are in the random oracle model, i.e., they assume that the hash function is modelled as an external random function accessible to all parties. On the other hand, a sequence of negative results shows that for certain classes of interactive protocols, the FS transform cannot be instantiated in the standard model.
Introduction
The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transformation [FS87] is a popular 1 technique to build efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments and signature schemes, starting from three-round public-coin (3PC) protocols satisfying certain properties. In a 3PC protocol the prover starts by sending a commitment α, to which the verifier replies with a challenge β drawn at random from some space B; finally the prover sends a reply γ and the verifier's verdict is computed as a predicate of the transcript (α, β, γ).
Perspective
The main contribution from our perspective is to initiate the study of restricted positive standardmodel results for the FS transform. Namely, we show that for the class of highly sound protocols, the FS transform can be instantiated via a q-wise independent hash function (both for the case of NIZK and signatures). This is particularly interesting given the negative results in [DNRS99, GK03, BDG + 13].
An important complementary question is, of course, to study the class of highly sound protocols. Under strong assumptions, our compilers show that highly sound protocols exist for all languages in NP. However, the compilers yield protocols in the CRS model and, at least for the case of NIZK, as we discuss now, one has to take particular care in interpreting positive results about the FS transform applied to 3PC protocols in the CRS model.
It is well known that in the CRS model one can obtain a NIZK both for NP-complete languages [BFM88] and for specific languages [GS08] . Let L be a language. Given a standard 3PC protocol for proving membership of elements x ∈ L, and with transcripts (α, β, γ), consider the following dummy "compiler" for obtaining a 3PC protocol for L in the CRS model. The first message α * and the second message β * of the compiled protocol are equal to the empty string ε; the third message is a NIZK proof γ * that x ∈ L. Note that the FS transform is easily seen to be secure (without random oracles) on such a dummy protocol, the reason for this being that α * and β * play no role at all in the obtained 3PC! Further note that this artificial "compiler" actually ignores the original protocol, and hence it does not rely on any of the security features of the underlying protocol. Regrettably, the above example does not shed any light on the security of the FS transform and when it applies.
In turn, our result for FS NIZK has two interesting features. First, our instantiation of the FS transform works even if the starting 3PC is in the standard model (provided that it satisfies P1-P3). Second, our CRS-based compiler is very different from the above dummy compiler in that we do not simply "throw away" the initial 3PC but instead rely on all of its properties in order to obtain a 3PC satisfying P1-P3.
We remark that the above limitation does not apply to our positive result for FS signatures, since assuming the initial 3PC protocol works in the CRS model does not directly yield a dummy compiler as the one discussed above.
Related Work and Open Questions
Our approach of first compiling any "standard" 3PC protocol into one with additional properties that suffice for proving security of the FS transform is similar in spirit to the approach taken by Haitner [Hai09] who shows how to transform any interactive argument into one for which parallel repetition decreases the soundness error at an exponential rate.
Lindell recently used a similar idea to first transform a 3PC into a new protocol in the CRS model, and then show that the resulting 3PC when transformed with (a slightly modified version of) Fiat-Shamir satisfies zero-knowledge in the standard model [Lin15] . We note that the use of a CRS-enhanced interactive protocol is only implicit in Lindell's work as he directly analyzes the collapsed non-interactive version. On the downside, to prove soundness Lindell still requires (non-programmable) random oracles. We note that one of our compilers is essentially equivalent to the compiler used by Lindell. Before Lindell's work, interactive protocols in the CRS model have also been studied by Damgård who shows how to build 3-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for all NP-problems in the CRS model [Dam00] .
It is also worth mentioning that using indistinguishability obfuscation and puncturable PRFs one can directly obtain a NIZK for all NP as shown by Sahai and Waters [SW14] . However, our main focus is not on constructions of NIZK, rather we aim at providing a better understanding of what can be proved for the FS transform without relying on random oracles. In this respect, our result shares similarities to the standard-model instantiation of Full-Domain Hash given in [HSW14] .
In the case of NIZK, an alternative version of the FS transform is defined by having the prover hashing the statement x together with value α, in order to obtain the challenge β. The latter variant is sometimes called the strong FS transform (while the variant we analyze is known as the weak FS transform). Bernhard et al. [BPW12] show that the weak FS transform might lead to problems in certain applications where the statement to be proven can be chosen adversarially (this is the case, e.g., in the Helios voting protocol). Unfortunately, it seems hard to use our proof techniques to prove zero-knowledge of the strong FS collapse, because the simulator for zero-knowledge does not know the x values in advance.
Other FS-inspired transformations were considered in the literature. For instance Fischlin's transformation [Fis05] (see also [DV14] ) yields a simulation-sound NIZK argument with an online extractor; as mentioned above, Lindell [Lin15] defines a twist of the FS transform that allows to prove zero-knowledge in the CRS model, and soundness in the non-programmable random oracle model. It is an interesting direction for future research to apply our techniques to analyze the above transformations without random oracles.
Roadmap
We provide a detailed informal overview of our main techniques in Section 2. In Section 3 we setup some notation and define the main cryptographic primitives on which we build. Section 4 contains our positive result for FS NIZK. We present our compilers for obtaining highly sound protocols (in the CRS model) in Section 5 and Section 6. Finally, we explain how to adapt our techniques to the case of FS signatures in Section 7.
Technical Overview
We first discuss the class of highly sound protocols for which the FS transform can be instantiated via a q-wise independent hash function. Then, we will explain how to obtain a compiler that transforms a large class of 3PC protocols into ones that are highly sound (in the CRS model). For the purpose of this overview we will only focus on the case of Fiat-Shamir NIZK, explaining only at the end how our techniques can be adapted to cover Fiat-Shamir signatures as well.
The security proof proceeds in two modular steps. In the first step, we prove completeness and soundness of a "selective" variant of the FS transform (which we define formally in Section 4.1); in the second step we analyze the standard FS transform using complexity leveraging. Details follow.
The selective FS transform. Consider a 3PC argument for a language L. For a hash family H, consider the following (interactive) selective adaptation of the FS transformation: The prover sends the commitment α as in the original protocol; the verifier, instead of sending the challenge β ∈ B directly, forwards a honestly generated hash key hk; finally the prover uses (hk, α) to compute β = H(hk, α) and then obtains the response γ as in the original 3PC argument.
In Section 4 we prove that if the starting 3PC protocol has instance-independent commitments, is complete and computationally sound, so is the one obtained by applying the selective FS transform. The idea is to use a "programmable" q-wise independent hash function (e.g., a random polynomial of degree q − 1 over a finite field) to "program" the hash function up-front; note that commitment α is computed before the hash key is generated and hence, we can embed the challenge value β into the hash function such that it maps α to β and reduce to the soundness of the underlying 3PC argument.
Complexity leveraging. The second step in proving soundness of the FS collapse (we discuss zero-knowledge below) consists in applying complexity leveraging so that we can swap the order of α and β. Note however that if β is shorter than α, and if the soundness of the protocol is 2 −|β| , then we loose too much through complexity leveraging. Moreover, if the commitment α depends on the witness, then it is not clear how to obtain an honestly generated α without already knowing a witness (which is needed in the reduction using complexity leveraging-see below). Hence, this step can only be applied to protocols satisfying certain properties as we discuss next. The first property is given below.
P1:
The value α output by the prover is computed independently of the instance x being proven (and of the corresponding witness w). 6 Let Π be the initial 3PC argument, and denote by Π its corresponding FS collapse. Given a malicious prover P * breaking soundness of Π, we construct a prover P attacking soundness of the selective FS transform as follows. P computes α as the honest prover would do (note that this can be done thanks to P1 above) and forwards α to the verifier; after receiving the challenge hash key hk, prover P runs P * which outputs a proof (α * , γ * ). Prover P simply hopes that α * = α, in which case it forwards γ * to the verifier (otherwise it aborts). It follows that if the selective FS has soundness roughly s(λ) (for security parameter λ), the soundness of Π is roughly s(λ)/δ(λ), where δ(λ) is the worst-case probability that the α computed by a honest prover is equal to a fixed value.
Note that for the above argument to give a meaningful bound, we need to assume that the ratio (λ) := s(λ)/δ(λ) is smaller than one. This leads to the second (non-standard) requirement that the initial 3PC argument should satisfy.
P2: (λ) := s(λ)/δ(λ) < 1, where s(λ) is the soundness error and δ(λ) is the worst-case collision probability associated to the commitment α.
Zero-knowledge. We assume that the initial 3PC is honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK)-i.e., that it is zero-knowledge for honest verifiers. We need to show that Π satisfies zero-knowledge. Here, in addition to P1, we need property P3 below.
P3:
The value α output by the simulator is computed independently of the instance x being proven.
We now discuss the reduction for the zero-knowledge property and explain where P1 and P3 are used. We need to construct an efficient simulator that is able to simulate arguments for adaptively chosen (true) statements-without knowing a witness for such statements. The output of the simulator should result in a distribution that is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution generated by the real prover. The simulator gets extra power, as it can produce a "fake" CRS together with some trapdoor information tk (on which the simulator can rely) such that the "fake" CRS is indistinguishable from a real CRS.
In order to build some intuition, it is perhaps useful to recall the random-oracle-based proof for the zero-knowledge property of the FS transform. There, values α i and β i corresponding to the i-th adversarial query are computed by running the HVZK simulator and are later "matched" relying on the programmability of the random oracle. Roughly speaking, in our standard-model proof we take a similar approach, but we cannot use adaptive programming of the hash-function. Instead, we rely on P1 and P3 to program the hash function in advance. More specifically, the trapdoor information will consist of q random tapes r i (one for simulating each proof queried by the adversary) and the corresponding q challenges β i (that can be pre-computed as a function of r i , relying on P1). Since the challenges have the correct distribution, we can use the underlying HVZK simulator to simulate the proofs; here is where we need P3, as the simulator has to pre-compute the values α i in order to embed the β i values on the correct points.
A caveat is that our simulator needs to know the value of q in advance; for this reason we only get a weaker bounded flavor of the zero-knowledge property where there exists a "universal" simulator that works for all adversaries askingueries, for some a-priori fixed value of q. Note, however, that the CRS-as it contains the description of a q-wise independent hash function-needs to grow with q, and hence bound q should be seen as a parameter of the construction rather than a parameter of the simulator.
It is an interesting open problem whether this limitation can be removed, thus proving that actually our transformation achieves unbounded zero-knowledge.
Compilers. Wrapping up the above discussion, we can show that for 3PC protocols that satisfy completeness, computational soundness, HVZK and additionally P1-P3, the FS transform can be instantiated by a (programmable) q-wise independent hash function. We informally refer to protocols that satisfy all of the above properties as highly sound arguments.
Unfortunately we do not know of a natural highly sound 3PC argument. However, we do know of protocols that partially satisfy our requirements. Recall, for instance, the classical 3PC argument for quadratic residuosity due to Blum [Blu81] (all operations are modulo an integer N which is the product of two Blum integers): (i) The prover chooses a random r in Z * N , and sends α = r 2 ; (ii) The verifier selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}; (iii) The prover computes γ = w β · r, and finally the verifier checks that γ 2 = x β · α. While the above clearly satisfies P1 and moreover can be shown to achieve completeness, soundness, and HVZK, one can easily see that P2 and P3 are not directly met. P2 is not met, because β consists only of a single bit and the soundness parameter is 1 2 , and to see that P3 is not met, one needs to consider the simulator for this protocol which-for readers familiar with the protocol-computes its first message depending on the statement.
Another interesting example is given by the Lapidot-Shamir protocol for the NP-complete problem of graph Hamiltonicity [LS91] (see also [OV12, Appendix B] ). Here, the prover's commitment consists of a (statistically binding) commitment to the adjacency matrix of a random k-vertex cycle, where k is the size of the Hamiltonian cycle. 7 Hence, the protocol clearly satisfies P1. Additionally the simulator fakes the prover's commitment by either committing to a random k-vertex cycle, or by committing to the empty graph. Hence, the protocol also satisfies P3. As a corollary, we know that assuming non-interactive statistically binding commitment schemes (which follow from one-way permutations [Blu81] ), for all languages in NP, there exist 3PC protocols that satisfy completeness, computational soundness, and HVZK, as well as P1 and P3.
Motivated by the above examples, we turn to the question whether it is possible to compile a 3PC protocol (with completeness, soundness, and HVZK) satisfying either P1 or P1 and P3, into a highly sound argument. We refer the reader to Section 4.5 for a high-level overview how this can be achieved. We only mention here that our compilers rely on several cryptographic tools (including indistinguishability obfuscation, puncturable PRFs, complexity leveraging and equivocal commitment schemes), and yield a 3PC in the CRS model; note that this means that we obtain an interactive protocol with a CRS even if the original protocol was in the standard model. It is an intriguing open problem if a highly sound argument can be constructed in the standard model, or whether a CRS is, in fact, necessary.
The case of signatures. Finally, let us explain how our techniques can be adapted to the case of FS signatures. To this end, we introduce a notion of highly-sound canonical identification schemes that need to satisfy similar requirements to the properties P1, P2, and P3 discussed above (for the case of 3PC arguments).
Recall that in order to apply our main technique, we need to program the q-wise independent hash function up-front. For this reason we are only able to show that our standard-model instantiation of FS signatures achieves the weaker notion of random-message unforgeability against random-message attacks (RUF-RMA)-in which the adversary can only observe signatures on randomly chosen messages, and also has to forge on an additional fresh random message. While strictly weaker that standard existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA), RUF-RMA is still useful for some applications (e.g., to secure authentication [FHN + 12, NVZ14]). We refer the reader directly to Section 7 for the details.
Preliminaries

Notation
By λ ∈ N, we denote the security parameter that we give to all algorithms implicitly in unary representation 1 λ . By {0, 1} we denote the set of all bit-strings of length , and by {0, 1} * the set of all bit-strings of finite length. If x, y ∈ {0, 1} * are two bit strings, then x y denotes concatenation. The length of x is denoted by |x|. We denote vectors of strings in bold face, for example, x and denote the i-th component by x[i]. For a finite set X, we denote the action of sampling x uniformly at random from X by x ←$ X, and denote the cardinality of X by |X|. We denote by [i] the set {1, . . . , i}. Algorithms are assumed to be randomized, unless otherwise stated. In particular polynomial-time refers to deterministic polynomial-time computable algorithms, while PPT refers to probabilistic polynomial-time. We write x ←$ A(·) to denote that probabilistic algorithm A is run on freshly sampled random coins and produces output x. We write x ← A(·; r) to denote that A runs on coins r. Similarly, we write x ← A(·) to denote that deterministic algorithm A outputs x. We say a function negl(λ) is negligible if negl(λ) ∈ λ −ω(1) . We say a function poly(λ) is polynomial if poly(λ) ∈ λ O(1) .
Function families.
We formalize families of functions F by considering a tuple of algorithms F.KGen, F.kl, F.Eval, F.il and F.ol. Algorithm F.KGen is a PPT algorithm taking the security parameter 1 λ and outputting a key k ∈ {0, 1} F.kl(λ) where F.kl : N → N denotes the key length. Functions F.il : N → N and F.ol : N → N denote the input and output length functions associated to F and for any x ∈ {0, 1} F.il(λ) and k ←$ F.KGen(1 λ ) we have that F.Eval(k, x) ∈ {0, 1} F.ol(λ) , where the PPT algorithm F.Eval denotes the "evaluation" function associated to F. Depending on the function, Eval may be renamed to a more speaking name and additional algorithms might be added. If the functionality is randomized then we let F.rl(λ) denote the randomness length.
Asymptotic security. In this paper we allow adversaries to be probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) and ask that the success probability be smaller than some function (λ) in the security parameter λ. However, when we fix a function (λ), then for finitely many λ, a specific PPT adversary might be more successful than (λ). Hence, when defining -security for a scheme, we say that for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage function Adv A (λ) is asymptotically smaller than , denoted Adv A (λ) asym ≤ (λ), which means that there is some value λ 0 such that for all λ ≥ λ 0 , it holds that Adv(λ) ≤ (λ).
For two random variables X and Y , we say that they are -indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y , if for all PPT distinguishers the distinguishing advantage is asymptotically smaller than .
q-Wise Independent Hashing
We recall the standard notion of a q-wise independent hash function. We note that the constant function H(hk, x) := hk is 1-wise independent and programmeable. Furthermore, note that we can construct a programmable q-wise independent hash function by considering polynomials of degree q − 1 over finite fields. Programmability is obtained by using polynomial interpolation.
Def inition 3.1 (q-Wise
Interactive and Non-Interactive Arguments
Let R : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a polynomial-time computable relation together with a polynomial p(·), defining the NP-language
In the rest of the paper, we will drop the bound p(·) for ease of presentation. An interactive argument system for R, consists of three PPT algorithms (K, P, V). Algorithm K takes as input 1 λ and outputs a common reference string (CRS) crs ∈ {0, 1} * . Later the prover P interacts with the verifier V to convince him into accepting a common input x ∈ L R (where both P and V are also given crs); the honest prover additionally holds a witness w for x, i.e. R(x, w) = 1. At the end of the protocol execution, the verifier outputs a bit (representing his decision); we write P(w), V (crs, x) for the random variable corresponding to the verifier's verdict. Similarly, we write P(crs, x, w) V(crs, x) for the random variable corresponding to transcripts of honest protocol executions. 8 An interactive argument should satisfy at least two properties, completeness and soundness. Completeness says that an honest prover (holding a valid witness) is able to convince the verifier.
Def inition 3.2 (Completeness)
Let Π = (K, P, V) be an interactive argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R. We say that Π satisfies c-completeness if for all (x, w) such that R(x, w) = 1 we have
where the probability is taken over the randomness of algorithms P, V and K.
Soundness informally says that, whenever x ∈ L R , no computationally bounded prover can convince the verifier into accepting x.
Def inition 3.3 (Soundness) Let Π = (K, P, V) be an interactive argument system for a polynomialtime computable relation R. We say that Π satisfies s-soundness if for all PPT algorithms P * , and for any x ∈ L R , we have that
where the probability is taken over the randomness of algorithms P * , V and K.
Completeness and soundness do not quantify how much information an interactive argument reveals about the witness, which in turn can be covered by notions such as witness indistinguishability and zero-knowledge. In this paper we will use different flavors of the zero-knowledge property. We will postpone the actual definitions to the place in the paper where they are actually used.
Standard model interactive arguments. We can cast the case where the interactive argument is in the standard-model, i.e., it does not rely on a CRS (which is typically the case), by saying that the algorithm K returns the empty string; similarly P and V do not take the CRS as input (or take an empty string as additional input). When we write Π = (P, V), we denote an interactive argument in the standard model. Adapting the definitions of completeness and soundness to the standard model works by replacing the CRS generation algorithm by an algorithm that outputs the empty string.
Non-interactive arguments. We speak of non-interactive arguments in case the protocol consists of a single message π sent from the prover to the verifier. Non-interactive arguments that satisfy a zero-knowledge property typically require a setup assumption, such as a CRS. 9 Syntactically a non-interactive argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R consists of three PPT algorithms Π := (K, P, V) specified as follows: (i) Algorithm K takes as input 1 λ and outputs a CRS crs ∈ {0, 1} * ; (ii) Algorithm P takes as input (crs, x, w) such that R(x, w) = 1 and outputs a proof π; (iii) Algorithm V takes as input (crs, x, π) and outputs a bit indicating whether π is a valid proof for x (under crs) or not.
A non-interactive argument should satisfy three main properties, which are analogous to the definitions of completeness, soundness and (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge for interactive arguments. We define these properties below.
Def inition 3.4 (Completeness of non-interactive arguments) Let Π = (K, P, V) be a noninteractive argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R. We say that Π satisfies c-completeness if for all (x, w) such that R(x, w) = 1 we have
Def inition 3.5 (Soundness of non-interactive arguments) Let Π = (K, P, V) be a non-interactive argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R. We say that Π satisfies s-soundness if for all for all PPT algorithms P * , and for any x ∈ L R , we have that
Def inition 3.6 (q-Bounded Computational Zero-Knowledge) Let Π = (K, P, V) be a noninteractive argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R. We say that Π satisfies q-bounded -computational zero-knowledge if for all binary PPT adversaries A there exists a PPT simulator S := (S , S ) such that rNIZK
, where experiments rNIZK and sNIZK are defined below Note that we quantify over all binary adversaries, that is, we consider only adversaries that output a bit. This is without loss of generality, but makes notation in later game-hop proofs easier. For brevity, we sometimes write that Π is a (c, s, q, )-NIZK to denote that Π satisfies c-completeness, s-soundness, and q-bounded -computational zero-knowledge. 
Obfuscation
A beautiful result that we will use is the relationship between differing-inputs obfuscation and indistinguishability obfuscation proved by Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14] , who show that any general purpose indistinguishability obfuscator is also a differing-inputs obfuscator for circuits that differ only on a few (at most polynomially many) inputs. We first define differing-inputs obfuscation by restricting samplers to be differing-inputs samplers. 
Def inition
With that we are ready to formulate the result due to Boyle, Chung and Pass [BCP14] .
Theorem 3.10 ([BCP14]) Let iO be an indistinguishability obfuscator for all circuits in P/poly. Let Sam be a differing-inputs circuit sampler for which there exists a polynomial
Then iO is a differing-inputs obfuscator for Sam, i.e., obfuscator iO is {Sam}-secure.
Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions
A key ingredient in the compilers are so-called puncturable pseudorandom functions (PRFs) [SW14] . A family of puncturable PRFs is a function family that additionally comes with a PPT puncturing algorithm Pntr which on input a polynomial-size set S ⊆ {0, 1} il(λ) , outputs a special key k S .
Def inition 3.11 (Puncturable PRF) A family of functions
F := (F.KGen, F.Pntr, F.kl, F.Eval, F.il, F.ol) is called a prf -secure,
puncturable PRF if the following holds.
Functionality preserved under puncturing. For every PPT adversary A such that
Pseudorandom at punctured points. For every PPT adversary (A 1 , A 2 ), the advantage Adv
where game pPRF is defined as
return y
Fiat-Shamir NIZK
We show that under specific assumptions on the underlying protocol, a q-wise independent hash function is enough to instantiate the random oracle in the Fiat-Shamir collapse yielding a secure NIZK with q-bounded computational zero-knowledge. After recalling the standard FS transform in Section 4.1, we present a "selective" interactive variant of the transformation, and establish its completeness and soundness in Section 4.2. Later, in Section 4.3, we put forward three properties of the initial 3PC argument that allow to prove completeness, soundness, and q-bounded computational zero-knowledge of the FS-collapse in the standard model; the proof of completeness and soundness reduce directly to the completeness and soundness of the above selective FS transform. Our main theorem is summarized in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5, we take a closer look at the required properties and discuss how to achieve them.
The Fiat-Shamir Transform
The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform [FS87] is a generic way to remove interaction from certain argument systems, using a hash-function. For the rest of the paper, we consider only interactive arguments consisting of three messages-which we denote by (α, β, γ)-where the first message is sent by the prover. We also focus on so-called public-coin protocols where the verifier's message β is uniformly random over some space B (e.g., β ∈ {0, 1} k for some k ∈ N). We call this a 3PC argument system for short.
For 3PC arguments it is convenient to think of the prover algorithm as being split into two sub-algorithms P := (P 0 , P 1 ), where P 0 takes as input a pair (x, w) and outputs the prover's first message α (the so-called commitment) and P 1 takes as input (x, w) as well as the verifier's challenge β to produce the prover's second message γ (the so-called response). In general P 0 and P 1 are allowed to share the same random tape, which we denote by r ∈ {0, 1} * . In a similar fashion we can think of the verifier's algorithm as split into two sub-algorithms V = (V 0 , V 1 ), where V 0 outputs a uniformly random value β ∈ B and V 1 is deterministic and corresponds to the verifier's verdict (i.e., V 1 takes as input x and a transcript (α, β, γ) and returns a decision bit d ∈ {0, 1}).
Non-interactive version. The FS transform allows to remove interaction from any 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R as specified below (see also Fig. 1 ). Let Π = (K, P, V) be the initial 3PC argument system. Additionally, consider a family of hash functions H consisting of algorithms H.KGen, H.kl, H.Eval, H.il and H.ol (see Section 3.1); here H.il and H.ol correspond, respectively, to the bit lengths of messages α and β (as a function of the security parameter λ).
The FS collapse of Π using H is a triple of algorithms Π FS,H := (K FS , P FS , V FS ) defined as follows. 
A 3PC Argument and its FS collapse
Figure 1: Message flow of a typical 3PC argument system and its corresponding FS collapse. In case the initial 3PC is in the standard model we simply have Π = (P, V) and crs contains only the hash key. Note also that we consider public-coin protocols and thus do not specify the randomness of the verifier (the randomness of V0 is β and V1 is deterministic given β).
• Algorithm K FS takes as input the security parameter, samples hk ←$ H.KGen(1 λ ), crs ←$ K(1 λ ), and publishes crs := (crs, hk).
• Algorithm P FS takes as input (crs, x, w) and runs P 0 (crs, x, w) in order to obtain the commitment α ∈ {0, 1} H.il(λ) ; next P FS defines the challenge as β := H.Eval(hk, α) and runs P 1 (crs, x, w, β) in order to obtain the response γ. Finally P FS outputs π := (α, γ).
• Algorithm V FS takes as input (crs, x, π) and returns 1 if and only if verifier
In a nutshell the result of Fiat and Shamir says that whenever Π = (P, V) is a (standard model) 3PC argument satisfying completeness, computational soundness, and computational honest-verifier zero-knowledge (in addition to a basic requirement on the min-entropy of the prover's commitment), its FS collapse Π FS,H is a NIZK argument system if H is modeled as a random oracle.
A Selective Variant of Fiat-Shamir
As an intermediate step in the proof of soundness of our standard model instantiation of the FS transform, we will consider a selective variant of the FS transform of a 3PC argument system which basically translates into allowing the hash function to depend on the commitment α. Note that this selective variant is still interactive since we consider the prover to be split into two algorithms, where the first algorithm is identical to P 0 and the second algorithm first computes β using the received hash key and later runs P 1 in order to obtain γ; similarly the verifier is split into two algorithms, where the first algorithm now generates the hash key (instead of sampling β directly) and the second algorithm is identical to V 1 : 
Note that the verifier in the above protocol accepts if and only if (α, β, γ) is an accepting proof for x and moreover β = H.Eval(hk, α). We write Π sel-FS,H for the above selective (interactive) version of the FS transform, and define its completeness and soundness properties below.
Def inition 4.1 (Completeness of the Selective FS Transform)
Let Π = (K, (P 0 , P 1 ), (V 0 , V 1 )) be a
3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R, and let Π sel-FS,H be the corresponding selective FS transform using hash function family H. We say that
where the probability is taken over the randomness of algorithms P 0 , P 1 , V, K and over the choice of the hash key.
Def inition 4.2 (Soundness of the Selective FS Transform)
be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R, and let Π sel-FS,H be the corresponding selective FS transform using hash function family H. We say that Π sel-FS,H satisfies s-soundness if for all PPT algorithms P * = (P * 0 , P * 1 ), and for all x ∈ L R , we have that
where the probability is taken over the randomness of algorithms P * , V, K and over the choice of the hash key.
Completeness and soundness for selective FS. We can now move on to state our first result: If H is a 1-wise independent hash function, then the selective FS transform instantiated with H maintains completeness and computational soundness of the starting 3PC argument. 10 Note that already the constant function H(hk, x) = hk is 1-wise independent and thus fulfills the requirements of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R, that is c-complete and s-sound, and let H be a 1-wise independent hash function. Then, the selective FS transform Π sel-FS,H of Π using H is c-complete and s-sound for relation R.
Proof. The proof for completeness and soundness follows directly from noting that β is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1} H.ol(λ) over the choice of the hash key, and as the hash key is chosen independently of α the proof reduces directly to the completeness and soundness of the interactive version of the underlying 3PC.
The FS-Collapse
We now consider the standard FS collapse and discuss each property (completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge) in turn. We reduce soundness and completeness to the soundness and completeness of the selective FS transform, and reduce zero-knowledge directly to the (instance-independent honest-verifier) zero-knowledge property of the underlying 3PC argument. Instance-independence is a new property for protocols that we define in this section. Note that, for our final theorem, we require the starting 3PC protocol to satisfy three "nonstandard" requirements (that we introduce along the way), including for example, the previously mentioned instance-independence property.
Completeness and Soundness
We start by showing that if the underlying 3PC argument satisfies completeness, so does the resulting FS non-interactive argument.
Lemma 4.4 Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R satisfying c-completeness. Then, assuming H is a 1-wise independent hash function, the FS collapse Π FS,H of Π using H satisfies c-completeness.
Proof. The proof follows by noting that when both the prover and the verifier of the non-interactive protocol are honest, the probability that the verifier accepts is the same as in the (interactive) selective variant of the FS transform applied to Π. The statement then follows from Theorem 4.3.
To capture soundness of the FS-collapse we need an additional property of the underlying 3PC protocol, namely, a gap between the probability δ with which one can guess the first message of the protocol and the soundness error s. We can interpret that s/δ < 1 as follows: even if we allow a loss of δ to guess the first message, then still there remains a level of security that can be leveraged to obtain soundness. We next capture the guessing probability δ and the soundness-errorto-guessing-gap . We begin with defining the guessing probability, that we call collision probability of commitments and note that it is a worst-case notion, i.e., it is the probability of the least likely value that the prover outputs.
Def inition 4.5 (Worst-Case Collision Probability of Commitments)
Let λ be a security parameter, and consider a 3PC argument system Π = (K, (P 0 , P 1 ), V) for a polynomial-time computable relation R. We say that Π has worst-case collision probability δ(λ) when min (x,w)∈R,α∈Im(P 0 (crs,x,w))
The soundness of our standard model instantiation depends on the gap between the soundness error and the worst-case collision probability.
Def inition 4.6 (Soundness-Error-to-Guessing Ratio) Let λ be a security parameter, and consider a 3PC argument system Π = (K, P, V) for a polynomial-time computable relation R with δ(λ) worst-case collision probability and s(λ)-soundness. The soundness-error-to-guessing ratio (SEGR) associated to Π is defined as (λ) :=
To prove soundness we need one more property of the underlying 3PC. While the above SEGR property is rather non-standard and we do not know if it can be realized in the standard model (recall that our compilers yield protocols in the CRS model) the following property is shared by many 3PC protocols. We require that the prover-we will later in Section 4.3.2 see an analogous definition for the HVZK simulator, which however seems to be less standard -chooses its commitment α independently of the instance x and the witness w. We call this property instance-independent commitment.
Def inition 4.7 (Instance-Independent Commitments) Let Π = (K, P = (P 0 , P 1 ), V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R. We say that Π has instanceindependent commitments if P 0 (crs, x, w; r) := P 0 (crs; r) for any choice of randomness r, instance x and witness w.
One example of a 3PC protocol that has instance-independent commitments is the 3PC argument due to Blum for the quadratic residuosity [Blu81] . Another example is given by the Lapidot-Shamir protocol for graph Hamiltoniacity [LS91] . Armed with a "sub-one" soundness-error-to-guessing ratio and instance-independent commitments we can now quantify the soundness of our instantiation of the FS-collapse.
Lemma 4.8 Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R, with worst-case collision probability δ and SEGR , s-soundness and instance-independent commitments. Then, assuming H is a 1-wise independent hash function, the FS collapse
Proof. Let algorithm P * FS be an adversary for the non-interactive FS collapse. Let x ∈ L R and let
the advantage of P * FS in breaking soundness of the FS collapse. We show how to use P * FS to construct a malicious prover P * := (P * 0 , P * 1 ) breaking soundness of Π sel-FS,H as follows. The prover P * 0 runs the honest (instance-independent 11 ) prover P 0 on (1 λ , crs) to get a value α and sends α to the verifier. It gets back a hash-function key hk that is independent from the value α that P * 0 sent to the verifier in the first message. Now, prover P * 1 runs prover P * FS on ((crs, hk), x) to obtain a pair (α * , γ * ). If α * = α, then P * 1 passes γ * to the verifier. Else, P * 1 aborts.
Observe that the success probability of P * is lower bounded by the success probability of P * FS times the probability that α * is equal to α. If the selective FS transform of Π has soundness s (λ) we obtain
where the last equality is due to Theorem 4.3. The statement now follows by a division of the inequality by δ and the definition of soundness-error-to-guessing ratio.
Zero-Knowledge
To quantify the zero-knowledge property of our instantiation of the FS collapse we need the analogue to instance-independent commitments for honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) simulators, that is, we require that also simulators can choose α and β independently of the instance. Note that while instance-independent commitments has nothing to do with the challenge β, it follows from the definition of 3PC protocols that β is chosen independently of the instance by verifier V 0 . Additionally, we note that we can only prove bounded HVZK, that is, we require that the adversary can only make q-many oracle queries where q is an arbitrary polynomial. We define the property in the CRS model and, again, note that the standard-model version of this definition is obtained by replacing the crs with an empty string.
Def inition 4.9 (q-Bounded Instance-Independent HVZK) Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system in the CRS model for a polynomial-time computable relation R, with instanceindependent commitments. We say that Π satisfies q-bounded instance-independent -computational honest-verifier zero-knowledge (instance-independent (q, )-HVZK for short) if there exists a PPT
, where experiments rIPS and sIPS are defined below:
and A can ask q(λ) queries to its oracle and outputs a single bit. Additionally we say that Π satisfies instance-independent -HVZK if indistinguishability of the above experiments holds for an arbitrary polynomial q(λ).
Note that a standard q-bound variant (i.e., without instance-independence) is obtained by fixing bit b in oracles Prov and Simu to 1 and provide P 0 with x and w as additional input, as then the oracles either return a complete honest transcript or a complete simulated transcript.
One example of a protocol readily satisfying (unbounded) instance-independent HVZK is given by the Lapidot-Shamir protocol for graph Hamiltoniacity [LS91] .
We are now in a position to quantify the zero-knowledge property of our instantiation of the FS collapse.
Lemma 4.10 Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R, such that Π has instance-independent commitments and satisfies q-bounded instanceindependent -HVZK. Then, assuming H is a programmable q-wise independent hash function, the FS collapse
Proof. For ease of notation let us write Π := Π FS,H . We start with the real distribution rNIZK Π A (λ), where the CRS is defined as crs = (crs, hk) for crs ←$ K(1 λ ) and hk ←$ H.KGen(1 λ ). Here the adversary A, given the CRS, can ask q adaptive queries (x i , w i ) to oracle Prov which replies with
We describe a series of computationally close hybrids, starting from rNIZK Π A (λ). The hybrids are depicted in Fig. 2 and are described below.
rNIZK 1 (λ): This is identical to the real experiment, but now the randomness r i used to generate the q proofs π i corresponding to A's queries is pre-sampled. Additionally, values α i = P 0 (1 λ ; r i ) are pre-computed-note that this is possible because of instance-independent commitmentswhich allows us to also pre-compute values β i as β i = H.Eval(hk, α i ) where hk is the hash key. All of these values are stored in a trapdoor tk which is given to the hybrid oracle (which is now a mixture between Prov and Simu). We write P.rl for the length of the random tape required for (P 0 , P 1 ). Note that the Prov oracle now additionally takes as input tk = (β, r 1 , . . . , r q ) and uses r i as random tape of both P 0 and P 1 (and thus of P FS ).
Observe that all of the above steps (pre-computing values) are clearly just syntactical changes, and thus rNIZK
rNIZK 2 (λ):
q-wise
In the second and last step we replace all values β i with uniformly random values sampled from the range of hash function H and the key hk is chosen via programming the hash function. Down to the programmable q-wise independence property of H the distribution corresponding to rNIZK 1 (λ) and rNIZK 2 (λ) are identical, i.e., rNIZK 2 (λ) ≡ rNIZK 1 (λ).
Simulator. Let S = (S , S = (S 0 , S 1 )) be the instance-independent HVZK simulator for the underlying 3PC protocol (cf. Definition 4.9). Let q denote a bound on the number of oracle queries of adversary A. We write S .rl to denote the length of the random tape required for algorithm S .
We construct simulator Sim = (Sim , Sim ) for q-bounded computational zero-knowledge (cf. Definition 3.6). Simulator Sim first runs S in order to obtain a pair (crs, tk). Afterwards Sim chooses q random strings r 1 , . . . , r q of length |r i | = S .rl(λ). It then runs S 0 on randomness r i to obtain q pairs (α i , β i ), and chooses a "programmed" hash key hk ←$ H. KGen(1 λ , α, β) . It outputs key hk together with crs as common reference string crs for the FS collapse, and tk together with the list of all r i 's as trapdoor tk. It thus perfectly simulates the setup in rNIZK 2 .
Upon input crs and tk, together with the i-th query x i , simulator Sim extracts randomness r i from tk and calls S on input (crs, tk, x i ) and with random coins r i to obtain a proof π i = (α, β, γ) which it returns. We give the pseudocode of Sim = (Sim , Sim ) in Figure 3 . Note that the adversary can only makeueries to its oracle and we provide index i as explicit input to simulator Sim . rNIZK 2 (λ) Sim (crs, tk, x, i) Analysis. Note that simulator Sim can pre-compute the values α i using the HVZK simulator S 0 of the underlying 3PC protocol. This is because S is instance-independent. It remains to show that for all q-query adversaries A, the distributions rNIZK 2 (λ) and sNIZK Sim Sim (λ) are computationally close which follows by q-bounded HVZK of the initial 3PC protocol. For this note that games rNIZK 2 (λ) and sNIZK Sim Sim (λ) differ only in how values α, β and γ are computed. In game rNIZK 2 (λ) they are computed with the honest prover while in game sNIZK Sim Sim (λ) they are computed using the instance-independent HVZK simulator S. Hence, an adversary against the instance-independent HVZK property of the underlying protocol can perfectly simulate games rNIZK 2 (λ) and sNIZK Sim Sim (λ), by running the steps of rNIZK 2 (λ) and using its oracle to obtain α i , β i and later using its oracle to complete proofs and obtain γ i . If the adversary is connected to Prov it perfectly simulates game rNIZK 2 (λ) and otherwise it perfectly simulates sNIZK Sim Sim (λ). Thus, if the underlying protocol is instance-independent (q, )-HVZK then
Putting it Together
Combining the results in the previous section we obtain the following theorem stating that the FS transform is instantiable with a q-wise independent hash function given that the underlying 3PC satisfies three properties P1-P3. Theorem 4.11 Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R. Let H be a programmable q-wise independent hash function. Assume that Π is c-complete and s-sound and additionally satisfies the following three properties:
Then, the FS collapse Π FS,H of Π using H is a (c, s , q, ) -NIZK for the relation R, with s = .
Obtaining the Required Properties
It remains the question which 3PC arguments (if any) satisfy properties P1-P3. While we know of protocols directly satisfying P1 (e.g., the Blum protocol [Blu81]), and of at least one candidate satisfying both P1 and P3 (i.e., the Lapidot-Shamir protocol [LS91]), we do not know any 3PC argument already satisfying all properties.
Hence, we turn to the question how to compile a 3PC argument into one satisfying all the properties we need. We do so using two compilers, as outlined below:
• Given a 3PC argument satisfying P1 and P3, we show a compiler yielding a 3PC argument that additionally satisfies P2, that is, it has a small soundness-error-to-guessing ratio while retaining properties P1 and P3. This compiler requires a CRS and relies heavily on indistinguishability obfuscation (which we formally introduce in Section 3.4), and is presented in details in Section 5.
• Given a 3PC argument satisfying P1 and special HVZK (properties, for example, present in the classical 3PC argument for quadratic residuosity due to Blum [Blu81] ), we show a compiler yielding a 3PC argument that additionally satisfies P3, that is, it has instance-independent HVZK while retaining property P1. This compiler-which is presented in details in Section 6-also requires a CRS, and is inspired by the recent work of Lindell [Lin15] . It relies on so-called dual-mode commitments [CV07] which can be set up either to be perfectly binding or to be equivocal.
Intuitively, the protocol is changed such that the prover, instead of sending α, sends a commitment c to α which it opens in the last message. As in an honest setup the commitment is perfectly binding, soundness and completeness follow easily; for zero-knowledge the simulator can setup the commitment scheme such that it is equivocal, which allows it to choose its first message as a simulated commitment and later open this to the message α as obtained by the underlying simulator. Note that, in particular, this allows the simulator to choose its first message independently of the instance x.
Open questions are whether we can similarly find compilers that do not require a CRS and whether there exist compilers also for protocols which do not already satisfy P1 and special HVZK.
Obtaining Small Soundness-Error-to-Guessing Ratio
In this section we present a compiler that turns a 3PC argument (possibly in the CRS model) with instance-independent commitments and HVZK (Definition 4.7) into a 3PC argument which has the soundness-error-to-guessing ratio (Definition 4.5) needed for the complexity leveraging in Lemma 4.8. We note that the resulting protocol will be in the CRS model regardless whether the starting protocol is in the CRS model or in the standard model. The idea for the compiler is to provide a mechanism that allows to produce many challenges β given only a single commitment α. To this effect the CRS will contain two obfuscated circuits to help the prover and the verifier run the protocol. For obfuscation we use an indistinguishability obfuscator (which we formally introduce in Section 3.4). The first circuit C 0 is used by the prover to generate a pre-commitment α * which it sends over to the verifier. The verifier will then use the second circuit C 1 and run it on α * to obtain multiple commitments. For this C 1 [k, crs] has a PRF key and the crs for algorithm P 0 of the underlying protocol hardcoded, and computes commitments as follows:
Using C 1 the compiled verifier V * can generate real commitments α[1] to α[ ] given the single (short) pre-commitment α * . The verifier will then run the underlying verifier V on all these commitments to receive β 1 , . . . , β which it sends back to the prover. In order to correctly continue the prover's computation (which was started on the verifier's side) the compiled prover P * needs to somehow obtain the randomnesses r * used within C 1 . For this, we will build a backdoor into C 1 which allows to obtain the randomness r * if one knows the randomness that was used to generate α * . Once the prover has recovered randomnesses r * 1 , . . . , r * it can run the underlying prover P on this randomness and the corresponding challenges β i to get correct values γ i which it sends back to the verifier. In a final step verifier V * runs the original verifier on the implicit transcripts (α i , β i , γ i ) i=1,..., and returns 1 if and only if the original verifier returns 1 on all the transcripts.
We will next present a formal description of the compiler and then show that it achieves the claimed properties and retains soundness, completeness and zero-knowledge.
The Compiler
Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system where the prover generates instance-independent commitments and that satisfies instance-independent HVZK. Let rl denote an upper bound on the randomness used by the prover (i.e., P.rl) and HVZK simulator (i.e., S.rl). Let F 1 be a puncturable pseudorandom function which is length doubling. Let F 2 be a puncturable pseudorandom function with F 2 .il = F 1 .ol and with F 2 .ol = rl. Let be a polynomial. We construct an argument system Π * = (K * , P * , V * ) in the CRS model as follows. On input the security parameter K * will construct an obfuscation of the following two circuits:
. 
Accept if, and only if, all proofs verify.
Recovered randomness that was used in the creation of α by circuit C1.
Figure 4: The compiled protocol from Section 5.1 to turn a 3PC protocol into one that has a small soundness-error-toguessing ratio (in the CRS model).
Note that we assume that the underlying protocol is in the CRS model and has a setup algorithm K. If this is not the case one recovers the transformation for a 3PC in the standard model by assuming that K outputs the empty string ε. The compiled 3PC Π * = (K * , P * , V * ) is then constructed as in Figure 4 .
Security Analysis
It remains to show that the compiled protocol is computationally sound, achieves (bounded) instanceindependent HVZK, is complete, and that it has instance-independent commitments and a sufficient soundness-error-to-guessing ratio: We discuss each of these properties in turn.
Completeness. Consider an honest protocol execution of the compiled protocol that does not end with an accepting vote of the verifier. As the final verification uses the underlying verifier and also α, β, and γ are constructed using the underlying algorithms P and V this thus yields also an honest protocol execution of the underlying protocol where the verifier does not accept. There are two things to note: the compiled protocol "internally" runs the underlying protocol multiple times ( times) and algorithm P 0 is run on pseudorandom coins rather than on truly random coins. Thus, if the underlying protocol is c-complete the compiled protocol is at most ( · c)-complete plus the distinguishing probability for the pseudorandom function.
Soundness. We analyze the soundness in two steps: Firstly, if the original protocol has soundess s, then its -parallel repetition version has soundness s , as the protocol is public-coin [PV07, HPWP10, CL09, CP15]. In a second step, we consider that α[1],...,α[
] are generated via applying the first stage of the prover P 0 to the output of an obfuscated pPRF rather than using truly uniformly random coins. We loose a factor of 2 −|α * | for the number of choices that the prover can make for the input to the obfuscated pPRF and else reduce to iO and the pPRF via a standard puncturing argument. Hence, when using iO that is 2 −|α * | log s -secure, and using a pPRF that is 2 −|α * | log s -secure, adding up soundness error s , iO-security 2 −|α * | log s and pPRF-security 2 −|α * | log s and multiplying them all by 2 |α * | , we obtain that the soundness of the compiled protocol is 2 · s − + 2 |α * | s − . Note that the length of α * is independent from the number of repetition and thus, we can make soundness as small as we want.
Soundness-error-to-guessing ratio.
For the collision probability of commitments (see Definition 4.5) note that the commitment of the compiled protocol α * is generated by evaluating pseudorandom function F 1 on a random value τ . As α * is independent of witness and instance we have that in the worst case every input τ ∈ F 1 .il(λ) is mapped to a different output which gives us a worst-case collision probability of 2 −F 1 .il (λ) . Note that in particular, the worst-case collision-probability is independent of the soundness amplification parameter (yielding a SEGR (λ) which is bounded away from 1).
Instance-independence.
The compiled protocol has instance independent commitments (see Definition 4.7). Furthermore, the protocol retains instance-independent HVZK simulators as we discuss below.
Zero-knowledge.
Finally, we show that the compiled protocol satisfies instance-independent q/ -bounded HVZK if the underlying protocol satisfies instance-independent q-bounded HVZK (see Definition 4.9). We show the proof for the simplified setting where the amplification parameter is set to 1. The proof for the general case is analogous. For the argument we assume the existence of an injective one-way function po with domain po.il = F 1 .il. The one-way function will be used as a simple point obfuscation scheme. To obfuscate a point x we store p x ← po(x) which allows us to later compare a point x by simply checking if p x = po(x ). Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC protocol which satisfies the conditions for the compiler and which is instance-independent HVZK. We need to show that the compiled protocol Π * = (K * , P * , V * ) achieves bounded instance-independent HVZK in the CRS model. For this we will use several game hops where the first game is the real world setting rIPS and the last game is identical to the simulated setting sIPS (with a simulator to be defined). We first describe the individual games and present the accompanying pseudocode in Figures 7, 8 , and 9 (starting on page 47). We present a formal analysis of the individual game hops after the description of all games and denote the reduction target for each step next to the game description.
Game 1 (λ): The game is identical to the real world setting rIPS where the crs is honestly generated by K * and the adversary on querying oracle Prov on an instance x in the language with witness w, obtains a transcript of an honest execution between prover P * (1 λ , crs, x, w) and verifier V * (1 λ , crs, x). Without loss of generality we assume that prover P * on the i-th query uses random coins τ i sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1} P.rl(λ) = {0, 1} F 1 .il(λ) .
The game is identical to the previous game except that setup K * now punctures k 1 on all values τ . For this it chooses q random values τ 1 , . . . , τ q in {0, 1} F 1 .il(λ) (if the values are not distinct we abort and define that the adversary wins). Additionally simple forms of "point obfuscations" are generated for all q points τ i by running each τ i through one-way function po to obtain
It then punctures key k 1 on values τ 1 , . . . , τ q to receive punctured key k * 1 and hardcodes this into both circuits. To not change the functionality on these circuits the original PRF values are hardcoded, that is α * i ← F 1 .Eval(k 1 , τ i ) is hardcoded into both circuits C 0 and C 1 . The branching and test operation whether an input is for a punctured value is done with the point obfuscation.
In addition, on the i-th call to oracle Prov prover P * is run on randomness τ i . Note that τ i is the only randomness of the prover and prover P * then choses its commitment as α i .
The game is identical to the previous game except that now values α * i are chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1} F 1 .ol(λ) .
Game 4 (λ):
The game is identical to the game before except that we define that the adversary wins in case any of the values α * [i] is chosen to be in the image of the PRF for key k 1 . Note that since F 1 is length doubling this happens only with probability q · 2 −λ .
Game 5 (λ):
iO As before but we again use the unpunctured key k 1 . The hardcoded values for τ 1 , . . . , τ q (i.e. their point obfuscations) as well as the α * i remain hardcoded.
We now change the if branch in circuit C 1 such that it does not depend on hardcoded values p τ anymore. Note that the if-branch was changed in the second step in order not to change the functionality of the circuits. This step changes the functionality by reverting the if-branch to check only whether input α * is different from F 1 .Eval(k 1 , τ ) (i.e., the original check). Game 10 (λ):
hvzk Let S = (S , S = (S 0 , S 1 )) denote the honest verifier zero knowledge simulator of the underlying 3PC protocol. The setting is identical to the previous game, but now we "switch to oracle Simu". The crs is generated as before with three exceptions: (1) the simulator of the underlying protocol S is run to generate a CRS and trapdoor crs and tk for the underlying protocol; (2) Values α are computed with simulator S 0 of the underlying protocol (with coins r * [i]); (3) As we are now in the simulated setting we generate the trapdoor tk to contain the randomness values r * 1 , . . . , r * q as well as pre-commitments α * 1 , . . . , α * q . On the i-th query (crs, tk, x, w, b, i) oracle Simu answers as follows: if b = 0 then it runs simulator S 0 of the underlying 3PC protocol on input its CRS and trapdoor and on randomness r i to obtain α and β (which are identical as the precomputed ones) which are returned to the adversary. If, on the other hand b = 1 it runs simulator S of the underlying 3PC protocol on input its CRS and trapdoor as well as instance x and with randomness r * i to obtain a proof π = (α, β, γ). Note that by definition, as S has instance-independent commitments S will generate a commitment and challenge as (α, β) ← S 0 (crs, tk, r * i ) (where crs and tk are the CRS and trapdoor by the underlying protocol). It replaces α for α * [i] and returns proof π * := (α * [i], β, γ).
We give a complete description of simulator Sim = (Sim , Sim = (Sim 0 , Sim 1 )) for the compiled protocol as pseudocode in Figure 5 .
Analysis. First note that simulator
Sim is indeed instance-independent. What remains to show is that the view of the adversary between Game 1 and the final game Game 10 does only negligibly change. We discuss each step in turn below.
Game 1 to Game 2 . By construction the generated circuits C 0 and C 1 are equivalent in both games and hence a distinguisher for the two games yields a distinguisher against the indistinguishability obfuscator. Note that we are not dealing with a single circuit but two circuits and thus we have that
where sampler Sam and distinguisher D are the adversary induced by games Game 1 and Game 2 .
Game 2 to Game 3 . By construction the only change is that the answers on "punctured points" are now chosen as uniformly random values. Thus, a distinguisher between the games induces a distinguisher against the puncturable pseudorandom function F 1 .
Figure 5: The complete pseudocode for q-bounded HVZK simulator Sim for the compiled protocol. Note that simulator Sim 1 runs the underlying simulator on the same random coins as simulator Sim 0 thus "generating" the same values (α, β).
Game 3 to Game 4 . By the fundamental lemma of the game playing technique [BR06] games Game 3 and Game 4 are identical unless event bad α * occurs which we can upper bound by q · 2 −F.il(λ) as the PRF by definition has stretch 2.
Game 4 to Game 5 . Noting that from Game 4 to Game 5 the circuits only change syntactically but not functionally (the unpunctured key k 1 is used instead of k * 1 ) allows us to perform an analysis analogously to the first game hop.
Game 5 to Game 6 . We will reduce the distinguishing advantage of any distinguisher between the two games Game 5 and Game 6 to the security of the indistinguishability obfuscator iO and the security of the injective one-way function po. For this we rely on the result of Boyle et al. [BCP14] who relate indistinguishability obfuscation and restricted differing-inputs obfuscation. We recall their result as Theorem 3.10 on page 14. For this we consider a circuit sampler Sam that runs the steps of Game 5 up to and including line 12. It outputs as auxiliary information circuit C 0 and string crs, that is, it sets aux ← (C 0 , crs). As circuits it constructs the circuit C 1 from line 13 once as in Game 5 and once as in Game 6 .
Additionally we construct a diO distinguisher that gets as input an obfuscation C 1 of either of the two circuits and the auxiliary information aux ← (C 0 , crs). It sets crs ← (crs, C 0 , C 1 ) and then runs the game distinguisher on input crs and outputs whatever it outputs.
If C 1 is as in Game 5 then together sampler and distinguisher perfectly simulate game Game 5 and otherwise they perfectly simulate Game 6 . We want to argue that
where [BCP14] denotes the loss from using the indistinguishability obfuscator in a diO setting and Adv owf po,A (λ) is a factor due to the use of one-way function po. For this we need to show that sampler Sam is differing-inputs and the circuits differ only on polynomially many points. First note that the two circuits, as prepared by sampler Sam, differ only on inputs τ [i] for i ∈ [q]. We can further reduce the advantage of any extractor in the Diff game to the inversion advantage Adv owf po,A (λ) of an adversary A against one-way function po. For this consider that all values in τ are sampled uniformly at random and no extra information about these values is available in aux. Thus an adversary A against the one-wayness of po that gets as input a random image y can simply choose q − 1 additional values po(τ i ) and construct auxiliary information and circuits as does sampler Sam but using y as one of the values in τ . An extractor that is successful in finding a differing input will with probability 1/q have inverted y which concludes the argument.
Game 6 to Game 7 . Again, the circuits are only changed syntactically allowing for an analogous analysis as in the first game hop.
Game 7 to Game 8 . Similarly to the second game hop the hardcoded values on punctured inputs are now chosen uniformly at random allowing for an analysis analogous to the second game hop.
Game 8 to Game 9 . Precomputing values α for the punctured target points does not change the functionality of circuit C 1 and an analysis analogously to the first game hop allows us to reduce the distinguishing probability to the security of the indistinguishability obfuscator. Note that here only C 1 is changed and thus:
Game 9 to Game 10 . On the i-th query simulator Sim runs the simulator S of the underlying 3PC protocol on random coins r * [i] to obtain (α, β, γ). As by assumption S is instance-independent it will generate (α, β, γ) such that (α, β) = S 0 (crs, tk; r * [i]) where crs and tk are the CRS and trapdoor of the underlying simulator. Simulator Sim returns as protocol transcript (α * [i], β, γ). By construction C 1 will map α * [i] to α thus presenting the adversary with an identical simulation as in the previous step except that (α, β, γ) are now generated by the HVZK simulator S. Thus a distinguisher between the two games can be used to construct a distinguisher against the HVZK simulator.
To construct an attacker against HVZK note that in line 8 of games Game 9 and Game 10 the randomness r * is not encoded in any of the circuits any longer and only used for running P 0 and S 0 , respectively. Thus we construct an adversary A that gets as input the crs and then runs game Game 9 up to but not including line 8. (The for loop is executed for the lines before line 8.) It then calls its oracle on all indexes i = 1, . . . , q and with bit b = 0 (and x set to, for example, ⊥, see also Definition 4.9). The oracle returns (α i , β i ) i=1,...,q which allows adversary A to construct vector α as is done in line 9. It then runs the remaining steps of the setup to obtain (crs, C 0 , C 1 ) which it passes on to the distinguisher. Queries of the distinguisher are passed on to its own oracle and it outputs whatever the distinguisher outputs. If the oracle implements Prov then the adversary perfectly simulates game Game 9 and otherwise it perfectly simulates Game 10 . Thus, if the underlying protocol achieves (q, )-bounded instanceindependent HVZK then
Note that for the general case with > 1 one needs to simulate q · oracle queries and thus looses a factor of .
Obtaining Instance-Independence
In this section, we present a compiler that turns a 3PC protocol with HVZK and instance-independent commitments into a 3PC protocol in the CRS model that has instance-independent commitments and instance-independent simulators, that is, the HVZK simulator produces α and β independently of the instance.
The idea is inspired by Lindell's compiler [Lin15] . Namely, we replace α by a commitment α * to α where the deployed commitment scheme can come in one of two modes: if honestly generated the commitment will be perfectly binding thus allowing us to directly argue that the resulting compiled protocol retains soundness and completeness. On the other hand, the commitment scheme can be initialized to be equivocal (looking indistinguishably from the honest commitment setup) such that a simulator can open a commitment to arbitrary values. This way, the simulator can first commit to an arbitrary α * and then, using the trapdoor in the CRS, it can open α * to some arbitrary value α. In particular, in the reduction to the HVZK property, the verifier can choose α * before knowing the statement that the simulator of the underlying protocol needs in order to produce α.
Such dual-mode commitment schemes were studied and constructed by Catalano and Visconti [CV07] who called them hybrid commitments. We here give the definition due to Lindell [Lin15] . We write C.Com(pp, m) taking public parameters pp and message m to obtain a commitment c and opening δ, and write C.Vf(pp, m, c, δ) to denote verification of a commitment. We also let C.il : N → N (resp., C.ol : N → N) denote the input (resp., output) length functions corresponding to C.
Def inition 6.1 (Dual-Mode Commitment)
A dual-mode commitment scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms (C.GenPP, C.Com, C.Vf, C.il, C.ol) with PPT commitment simulator (S com .GenPP, S com .Com, S com .Open) such that the following holds.
Public Parameters. On input the security parameter 1 λ algorithm GenPP outputs public parameters pp.
Perfect Completeness. For all security parameters λ ∈ N and all messages m ∈ {0, 1} C.il(λ) it holds that
Perfectly Binding. For all security parameters λ ∈ N and all public parameters pp ←$ GenPP(1 λ ) algorithm C.Com is a perfectly-binding non-interactive commitment scheme, that is, for all security parameters λ ∈ N, all messages m, m ∈ {0, 1} C.il(λ) such that m = m , and all openings δ ∈ {0, 1} * we have that
should be negligible where game COM is defined as
Additionally to dual-mode commitments we require that the underlying 3PC protocol satisfies so-called special HVZK that essentially allows the simulator to simulate arguments for a given challenge β ∈ B.
Def inition 6.2 (Special HVZK) Let Π = ((P 0 , P 1 ), V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomialtime computable relation R. We say that Π satisfies special -HVZK if there exists a PPT machine S such that for all x ∈ L R and for all β ∈ B the following two distributions are -computationally indistinguishable
In other words, for any β ∈ B, the simulator outputs an argument (α, β, γ) with this challenge, which is indistinguishable from a real argument with challenge β.
As observed by Fischlin [Fis05] common protocols obey this special zero-knowledge notion and if, furthermore, the challenge size is logarithmic in the security parameter then assuming special HVZK is without loss of generality.
The Compiler
Given a 3PC protocol Π = (P, V) with HVZK simulator S which satisfies the conditions above, we construct a compiled protocol Π * = (K * , P * , V * ) as follows. Let C = (C.GenPP, C.Com, C.Open, C.il, C.ol) be a dual-mode commitment scheme, where C.GenPP is the honest public parameter generator for the perfectly binding variant of the commitment scheme. On input the security parameter setup algorithm K * simply runs the public parameter generation of the commitment scheme.
We present the compiled protocol in Figure 6 . What remains to show is that the compiled protocol retains instance-independent commitments, completeness, soundness and that it achieves instance-independent HVZK simulators.
. pp ← crs pp ← crs 
Security Analysis
Theorem 6.3 Let Π = (K, P, V) be a 3PC argument system for a polynomial-time computable relation R such that Π is c-complete and s-sound and has instance-independent commitments and satisfies special HVZK. Let C = (C.GenPP, C.Com, C.Open, C.il, C.ol) be a dual-mode commitment scheme. Then, in the CRS model, the compiled protocol Π * = (K * , P * , V * ) is c-complete, s-sound and satisfies unbounded instance-independent HVZK. Furthermore the compiled protocol has instanceindependent commitments.
We discuss the various properties in turn.
Instance-independent commitments. As instead of the original commitment α now we use α * which is a commitment to α, the compiled protocol retains instance-independent prover commitments.
Completeness. If the public parameters are generated honestly for the commitment scheme, the scheme is perfectly binding. Hence, if on an honest execution the verifier does not accept it would not accept for the same execution on the underlying protocol. Hence, if the underlying protocol is c-complete then so is the compiled protocol.
Soundness. Again soundness directly follows from the underlying protocol and the fact that the commitment scheme is perfectly binding if the public parameters are honestly created. Thus, if the underlying 3PC protocol has s-soundness then so does the compiled protocol.
Zero-knowledge. We show that if the underlying protocol satisfies special-HVZK then the compiled protocol satisfies q-bounded instance-independent HVZK (see Definition 4.9). Note that, in fact we can prove an unbounded variant, but for our purpose the bounded variant suffices as our FS-collapse only supports bounded zero-knowledge. Further note that we require the underlying protocol to satisfy special-HVZK but claim that the compiled protocol does not achieve special any longer. We note that the compiled protocol, in fact, achieves a special-instance-independent HVZK variant but again, as we do not need this for our result we chose not to additionally formalize it. The proof will be down to the security of the commitment scheme and the special-HVZK of the underlying protocol and consists of two game hops.
Game 1 (λ): The first game is equivalent to real world setting rIPS Π * A where the adversary has access to the Prov oracle which runs honest executions of the protocol to obtain the transcripts for the adversary.
The setting is similar to the previous game with the exception that now the commitment is returning fake commitments. In order for this to work we switch to the Simu oracle and let the trapdoor contain the commitment trapdoor. That is, the setup algorithm is changed to run the simulated commitment setup and then the first message of the prover is replaced by a simulated commitment. To make the view consistent on calling Simu with b = 1 the simulated commitment will be opened to the correct α as obtained by the underlying protocol. For this note that at this point the adversary already supplied a valid instance and witness. That is the protocol transcript is still computed with the underlying prover and simulator. The current setting is best visualized with an adapted protocol: 
Prover: P
Game 3 (λ):
hvzk
The setting now switches to use the HVZK simulator S of the underlying protocol. Calls to Simu with bit b = 0 are answered as before with a simulated commitment. Note that while in the last setting β was chosen by the verifier V 0 we now choose a random value β ∈ B. (Technically this is not a change, since we consider 3PC protocols.) If later for the same index a call to Simu with bit b = 1 is made, then the special HVZK simulator is run on challenge β (that was chosen before) and instance x to obtain (α, γ) ←$ S(x, β). Then, as before the commitment is opened to α and (α * , β, (γ, α, δ)) is returned to the adversary. Before we present the pseudocode of the simulator, we again present a view of the adapted protocol to visualize the setting: 
We next present the pseudocode of the simulator Sim = (Sim , (Sim 0 , Sim 1 )). Note that it is assumed that Sim 0 and Sim 1 are always run on matching random coins, that is, Sim 1 can recover (α * , β) as output by Sim 0 (see Definition 4.9).
What is left to show is that the two game hops are negligibly close. We prove this below.
Game 1 to Game 2 . The difference between the settings in Game 1 and Game 2 matches exactly the commitment game. That is, a distinguisher can be turned into an adversary against the commitment scheme. The commitment scheme adversary takes as input the public parameters pp which it forwards to the distinguisher between games Game 1 and Game 2 . On an oracle query for index i with bit b the adversary distinguishes between b being set to 0 or to 1 and answers in these cases as follows: b = 0 It runs the underlying prover P 0 on input the security parameter to obtain message α. It then sends α to its commitment oracle to receive commitment α * and opening δ. Finally, it runs verifier V 0 on input the security parameter to receive β and returns (α * , β) to the distinguisher. b = 1 It recovers α, α * and β (or if the corresponding call with b = 0 was not yet made, it performs the above steps). It then calls prover P 1 on input x, w and β to receive γ. (Note that P 1 is run on the same random coins as prover P 0 before, and is thus able to recover α.) Finally, it returns to the distinguisher (α * , β, (γ, α, δ)).
It is easy to see that if the commitment oracle returns simulated commitments then the adversary perfectly simulates Game 2 and otherwise Game 1 . Thus, we have:
Game 2 to Game 3 . The difference between the two games matches exactly the setup of the special-HVZK setting. That is, a distinguisher between the two games can be turned into an adversary A against the special-HVZK property of the underlying protocol. For this, adversary A runs the simulated setup of the commitment scheme to obtain (pp, tk com ) ←$ S com .GenPP(1 λ ) and forwards pp as CRS to the distinguisher. On an oracle query for index i with bit b the adversary A distinguishes between b being set to 0 or to 1 and answers these cases as follows: If the adversary receives honest protocol transcripts then it perfectly simulates Game 2 and otherwise it perfectly simulates Game 3 . Thus, the distinguishing probability between the two settings can be upper bounded by:
assuming that the underlying 3PC protocol is special -HVZK. This concludes the proof.
Fiat-Shamir Signatures
We explain how to extend our techniques in order to obtain a standard model instantiation of FS signatures, under similar complexity assumptions as in the case of FS NIZK. In particular we will identify a certain class of so-called highly sound identification (ID) schemes, such that we can instantiate the hash function in the corresponding FS collapse via a q-wise independent hash function. On the positive side, we remark that the obtained signature scheme is in the standard model (i.e., without a CRS) even if the starting identification scheme is in the CRS model; the reason is that in the case of signatures we can always include the CRS as part of the public key of the verifier. On the negative side, the obtained signature scheme satisfies only a weak unforgeability flavour.
We recall the definition of ID and signature schemes in Section 7.1. Section 7.2 contains our positive result for FS signatures in the standard model. Finally, in Section 7.3, we explain how to obtain the desired properties by relying on similar tools as the ones used in the compilers from Section 5 and Section 6.
Identification and Signature Schemes
The FS transform can be used in order to generically obtain signature schemes starting from ID schemes satisfying certain properties.
Canonical ID schemes. An ID scheme consists of three PPT algorithms (K, P, V). Algorithm K takes as input 1 λ and outputs a CRS crs ∈ {0, 1} * , together with a pair of keys (pk, sk), where pk is called the public key and sk is called the secret key. (In case the ID scheme is in the standard model, then we simply set crs = ε.) Later the prover P interacts with the verifier V to convince him he knows the secret key sk corresponding to pk (where both P and V are also given crs). At the end of the protocol execution, the verifier outputs a bit (representing his decision); we write P(sk), V (crs, pk) for the random variable corresponding to the verifier's verdict. Similarly, we write P(crs, pk, sk) V(crs, pk) for the random variable corresponding to transcripts of honest protocol executions.
For applying the FS transform one is typically interested in so-called canonical ID schemes. Intuitively, canonical ID schemes are the counterpart of 3PC arguments (cf. Section 4.1). In particular, we can think of the prover algorithm as being split into two sub-algorithms P := (P 0 , P 1 ), where P 0 takes as input a pair (pk, sk) and outputs the prover's first message α (the so-called commitment) and P 1 takes as input (pk, sk) as well as the verifier's challenge β to produce the prover's second message γ (the so-called response). In general P 0 and P 1 are allowed to share the same random tape, which we denote by r ∈ {0, 1} * . In a similar fashion we can think of the verifier's algorithm as split into two sub-algorithms V = (V 0 , V 1 ), where V 0 outputs a uniformly random value β ∈ B and V 1 is deterministic and corresponds to the verifier's verdict (i.e., V 1 takes as input pk and a transcript (α, β, γ) and returns a decision bit d ∈ {0, 1}).
A canonical ID scheme typically satisfies three properties known as completeness, soundness, and HVZK, which are analogues to the corresponding properties of 3PC argument systems. We provide an informal definition of completeness and soundness below (we discuss HVZK later in this section).
• Completeness. The honest prover P (holding sk) convinces the verifier V (holding pk) with overwhelming probability (over the randomness of K, P, V).
• Soundness. For all PPT provers P * , the probability that P * convinces V on common input (crs, pk) is bounded by s(λ) ∈ negl(λ). 12
Signature schemes. A signature scheme is a triple of PPT algorithms (K, S, V). Algorithm K takes as input the security parameter 1 λ and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk). Algorithm S takes as input a pair (sk, m), and outputs a signature σ on message m ∈ {0, 1} * . Algorithm V takes as input pk and a pair (m, σ) and returns a decision bit d ∈ {0, 1}. We say that a signature scheme satisfies completeness if for all messages m ∈ {0, 1} * we have that V(pk, (m, S(sk, m))) = 1 with overwhelming probability over the generation of (pk, sk).
The standard security notion for signature schemes is called existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA). Roughly speaking this notion demands that it should be hard to forge a signature without knowing the secret key, even when given access to an oracle, signing polynomially many messages of the adversary's choice. Here, we will instead stick to a strictly weaker notion called random-message unforgeability against random message attack (RUF-RMA). The difference is that now both signature queries and the final forgery are for messages that are not under the adversary's control (in particular they are uniformly random messages).
Def inition 7.1 (RUF-RMA) Let Π = (K, S, V) be a signature scheme. We say that Π satisfies q-bounded random-message unforgeability against random-message attacks (q-bounded RUF-RMA) if for all PPT adversaries A asking at most q oracle queries the following holds:
where oracle Sign(sk), upon each query, samples a fresh random message m i ←$ {0, 1} * and returns
FS signatures. The FS transform allows to turn canonical ID schemes into signature schemes, as specified below. Let Π = (K, P, V) be the initial canonical ID scheme. Additionally, consider a family of hash functions H consisting of algorithms H.KGen, H.kl, H.Eval, H.il and H.ol (see Section 3.1); here H.il and H.ol correspond, respectively, to the bit lengths of messages α||m and β (as a function of the security parameter λ). The FS collapse of Π using H is a triple of algorithms Π FS,H := (K FS , S FS , V FS ) defined as follows.
• Algorithm K FS takes as input the security parameter, samples hk ←$ H.KGen(1 λ ), (crs, pk, sk) ←$ K(1 λ ), and outputs pk := (crs, hk, pk) and sk := (crs, hk, pk, sk).
• Algorithm S FS takes as input sk := (crs, hk, pk, sk) and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and runs P 0 (crs, pk, sk) in order to obtain the commitment α ∈ {0, 1} H.il(λ)−|m| ; next P FS defines the challenge as β := H.Eval(hk, α||m) and runs P 1 (crs, pk, sk, β) in order to obtain the response γ. Finally P FS outputs σ := (α, γ).
• Algorithm V FS takes as input pk := (crs, hk, pk) and a pair (m, σ), and returns 1 if and only if verifier V 1 (crs, pk, (α, β, γ)) = 1 where β = H.Eval(hk, α||m).
Proof of Random-Message Unforgeability
In a nutshell the result of Fiat and Shamir (for the case of signatures) says that whenever Π = (P, V) is a (standard-model) canonical ID scheme satisfying completeness, computational soundness, and computational HVZK (in addition to a basic requirement on the min-entropy of the prover's commitment), its FS collapse Π FS,H is an EUF-CMA signature scheme if H is modeled as a random oracle.
Here we show that the FS transform admits a very simple standard-model instantiation when starting from a special class of canonical ID schemes Π = (K, P, V) satisfying three additional properties. The obtained signature scheme will satisfy q-bounded RUF-RMA. Since most of the technical details are identical to our standard-model instantiation for FS NIZK, we only highlight the main differences here. The properties we need are defined below:
P1 :
The first property requires that the commitment α can be computed independently of (pk, sk),
i.e. α ←$ P 0 (crs). This property is analogous to "instance-independent commitments" for argument systems (cf. Definition 4.7).
P2 :
We can define the worst-case collision probability of commitments δ(λ) in the same way as we did for argument systems (cf. Definition 4.5). The second property requires that the SEGR (λ) := s(λ)/δ(λ) is negligible in the security parameter, where s(λ) is the soundness parameter of the ID scheme. The definition of SEGR is analogous to the definition of SEGR for argument systems (cf. Definition 4.6).
P3 :
There exists a PPT simulator S := (S , S ) such that the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
• Adversary A(crs, pk) asking up-toueries to an oracle returning transcripts of honest executions between P(crs, pk, sk) and V(crs, pk), where (crs, pk, sk) are generated by running algorithm K.
• Adversary A(crs, pk) asking up-toueries to S , where crs is generated by running S (also holding a trapdoor tk) and (pk, sk) are generated using K. Here, S computes a simulated transcript (α, β, γ) knowing only pk (and some trapdoor information); furthermore the simulator can compute (α, β) independently of pk.
This property is analogous to "q-bounded instance-independent HVZK" for argument systems (cf. Definition 4.9).
We will call canonical ID schemes satisfying properties P1 -P3 above (besides completeness and soundness) highly sound canonical ID schemes.
Theorem 7.2 Let Π = (K, P, V) be a highly sound canonical ID scheme and H be a programmable q-wise independent hash function. Then, the FS collapse Π FS,H of Π using H yields a signature scheme satisfying q-RUF-RMA.
Proof (sketch).
Assume there exists a PPT adversary A and some polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N the following holds:
where oracle Sign FS (sk) internally runs the signing algorithm S FS (sk, ·).
We consider a series of computationally indistinguishable games, which are outlined below.
Game 1 (λ): This is identical to the RUF-RMA experiment, but now the randomness r i used to generate the q signatures σ i corresponding to A's signature queries, and the q messages m i ←$ {0, 1} * , are pre-sampled. Additionally, values α i = P 0 (1 λ ; r i ) are pre-computed-note that this is possible because of property P1 -which allows us to also pre-compute values β i as β i = H.Eval(hk, α i ||m i ) where hk is the hash key. All of these values are stored in a trapdoor tk which is given to the hybrid oracle answering signature queries.
We say that Game 1 (λ) = 1 if and only if the forgery returned by A is accepting. Observe that all of the above steps (pre-computing values) are clearly just syntactical changes, and thus
Game 2 (λ):
In the second step we replace all values β i with uniformly random values sampled from the range of hash function H and the key hk is chosen via programming the hash function. Down to the programmable q-wise independence property of H the distribution corresponding to Game 1 (λ) and Game 2 (λ) are identical, i.e., Game 2 (λ) ≡ Game 1 (λ).
HVZK
In the third step we change the way signature queries are answered. In particular, instead of running S FS (sk, ·), we define a simulator Sim that answers signature queries only given as input pk (and some trapdoor information). The simulator pre-computes all values and then relies on the HVZK simulator S (here is where we use property P3 ). The description of Sim is essentially identical (with minor modifications) to the simulator Sim defined in the proof of Lemma 4.10, and is therefore omitted. Down to the q-bounded instance-independent HVZK property of Π, we can write:
Combining the above equations, we have that there exists a polynomial p(·) such that, for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N, Pr[Game 3 (λ) = 1] ≥ 1/p(λ).
We now use this fact to contradict the soundness of the underlying ID scheme. This last step of the proof is analogous to the proof of soundness for FS NIZK, and consists of two sub-steps that are outlined below:
• In the first step, we consider a selective variant of the FS transform, in a similar way as we did in Section 4.3 for the case of argument systems. In the selective variant, which we denote by Π sel-FS,H , the verifier V sends a random hash key hk together with a random message m * ←$ {0, 1} * that is hashed by the prover together with the commitment α in order to generate the challenge β (and the corresponding answer γ).
Note that the above described selective variant of the FS transform still yields a public-coin ID scheme. Furthermore, it is easy to prove that Π sel-FS,H satisfies both completeness and soundness, provided that the original ID scheme does. This proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 4.3, and is therefore omitted.
• In the second step, we use the adversary A (with non-negligible advantage in game Game 3 (λ)) to construct a prover P * that breaks the soundness of Π sel-FS,H with non-negligible advantage.
Prover P * receives as input a pair (crs, pk), and initially runs the honest (instance-independent) prover P 0 (crs) in order to obtain a value α that it forwards to the verifier. The verifier replies with a random hash key hk and random message m * ∈ {0, 1} * . At this point, P * initializes the adversary A with a simulated public key pk = (crs , hk, pk) (where crs is the simulated CRS coming from Sim) and replies to A's signature queries as specified in Game 3 (λ) (i.e., by running the simulator Sim). Finally, it forwards m * to A obtaining a forgery σ * = (α * , γ * ).
In case α * = α, then P * passes γ * to the verifier. Else, P * aborts.
Clearly, the probability of P * breaking soundness is lower bounded by the success probability of A times the probability that α * is equal to α. It follows that, if Π sel-FS,H has soundness parameter s(λ), the SEGR (λ) := s(λ)/δ(λ) ≥ 1/p(λ), contradicting property P2 .
The above two facts imply the statement of the theorem.
Obtaining the Required Properties
It remains to construct a highly sound canonical ID scheme. As we briefly explain now, the latter can be done using similar techniques as the ones we used to construct highly sound 3PC arguments. Let us start with any (standard-model) canonical ID scheme Π that satisfies completeness, soundness, HVZK, and moreover has instance-independent commitments (i.e., property P1 ). Many canonical ID schemes satisfy this requirement, including the ones by Schnorr [Sch91] and GuillouQuisquater [GQ90] . Hence, we can apply the two compilers described in Section 5 and Section 6 in order to obtain a highly sound canonical ID scheme Π as follows:
• First, we transform Π into an ID scheme Π that additionally satisfies P3 (i.e., the HVZK simulator is instance-independent). This is achieved by having the prover commit to the value α that would have been sent in Π using an equivocal commitment, in a similar fashion as we did in our compiler from Fig. 6 .
• Second, we transform Π into an ID scheme Π that additionally satisfies P2 . This is achieved by providing a mechanism that allows to produce many challenges β given only a single commitment α, in a similar way as we did in the compiler from Fig. 4 .
We remark that, for the case of FS signatures, the obtained signature scheme will be in the standard model even though the starting highly sound canonical ID scheme is in the CRS model. 
